BitVPS

透明 金丝雀

每周发布的 PGP 签名声明,确认我们被强制执行任何操作。每周一自动以公开密钥重新签名。若声明过期且无对应事故说明,请假设情况已发生重大变化

金丝雀声明有效。 已于 2 天s前签名 · 下次签名在 2d 天2s后 · sd 天后视为过期。
签名时间 2026-05-25 W22-2026 密钥 0xA62AEDAF647EE3E6
BitVPS warrant canary seal

当前 签名声明

以公开的 BitVPS 密钥 PGP 明文签名的原文。签名覆盖下方完整字节——您可以自行复制并运行 gpg --verify 验证。

签名时间 2026-05-25 · 周 W22-2026 · 密钥 0xA62AEDAF647EE3E6
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256

BitVPS Ltd — Warrant Canary
Week  : W22-2026
Signed: 2026-05-25 (Monday)
Period: 2026-05-18 through 2026-05-24 inclusive (UTC)

STATEMENTS

1. BitVPS Ltd has NOT received, as of the date of this signing:
   - any National Security Letter from any jurisdiction;
   - any gag order or prior-restraint order from any jurisdiction;
   - any bulk-metadata retention or bulk-surveillance order from any jurisdiction;
   - any order requiring BGP route injection, DNS hijack, or active tampering with
     customer traffic;
   - any request to install surveillance equipment or to provide a backdoor into
     our hypervisor, control panel, billing, or support systems.

2. BitVPS Ltd has NOT been compelled to transfer ownership or operational
   control of any Infrastructure to any third party.

3. BitVPS Ltd's signing key (the key whose fingerprint appears on the
   published signature below) remains in the sole custody of the original two
   founding engineers, unmodified, and has NOT been replaced, compromised or
   surrendered since its publication on 2026-04-22.

AGGREGATE REPORTING (period 2026-05-18 to 2026-05-24 UTC)

- - DMCA-style take-down notices received .............. 139
- - DMCA-style take-down notices actioned ..............   0    (see /dmca)
- - Court orders received (Saint Kitts and Nevis) ......   0
- - Court orders received (Iceland) ....................   0
- - Court orders received (Netherlands) ................   0
- - Court orders received (Romania) ....................   0
- - Court orders received (Switzerland) ................   0
- - Court orders complied with .........................   0    (narrow scope)
- - Abuse reports received (all categories) ............ 360
- - Abuse reports actioned .............................  3    (see /abuse)

NOTE ON ABUSE ACTIONING

Abuse reports were actioned solely where the underlying content was
child sexual abuse material (CSAM). No other category — copyright /
DMCA take-downs, defamation claims, terms-of-service complaints, nor
jurisdiction-specific content requests — triggered any removal,
suspension, or upstream disclosure during this reporting period.

NEXT SIGNING

This canary is renewed every Monday. The next signing is scheduled for
2026-06-01. If no successor signature has appeared by 2026-06-08 (14 days after
this one) and no publicly-announced infrastructure incident explains the delay,
assume something material has changed and act accordingly.

The current public key is fingerprint:
  4DCF 5D6D 10AF F2AA 47E2  070E A62A EDAF 647E E3E6

Archived signed statements are available under /canary/archive/.

- -- BitVPS Ltd
   
   Charlestown, Saint Kitts and Nevis
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----

iHUEARYIAB0WIQRNz11tEK/yqkfiBw6mKu2vZH7j5gUCahb2zgAKCRCmKu2vZH7j
5rcsAQCEC1dNEARN18pIyIDlvDNeExVbCiHeMbU1dgU3gymAMwD/Zs16g0S0DwjP
lperZpaMKpvJIzZl3XHK0ELB2CuLlgc=
=UGZD
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

如何 验证

您需要安装 GnuPG。整个流程约需十秒钟。

1

导入我们的公钥

下载 bitvps-pubkey.asc,然后运行 gpg --import bitvps-pubkey.asc

2

确认指纹

密钥指纹必须为 4DCF 5D6D 10AF F2AA 47E2 070E A62A EDAF 647E E3E6。请通过 _openpgpkey.bitvps.io DNS 记录及 keys.openpgp.org 交叉验证。

3

下载金丝雀声明

保存签名块:curl -o canary.asc https://bitvps.io/canary/current.asc

4

验证签名

运行 gpg --verify canary.asc。输出必须包含 “Good signature” 及第 2 步中的指纹。若不符——请立即停止并将金丝雀视为已被攻破。

历史 签名记录

所有历史金丝雀声明均可下载。当前周置于顶部,随日历推进历史周依次填充。

签名时间 覆盖周期 已收 DMCA 已收订单 封口令 归档
当前 2026-05-25 W22-2026 2026-05-18 / 2026-05-24 139 0 0 .asc
2026-05-18 W21-2026 2026-05-11 / 2026-05-17 167 1 0 尚未
2026-05-11 W20-2026 2026-05-04 / 2026-05-10 141 0 0 .asc
2026-05-04 W19-2026 2026-04-27 / 2026-05-03 187 0 0 .asc
2026-04-27 W18-2026 2026-04-20 / 2026-04-26 158 0 0 .asc
2026-04-20 W17-2026 2026-04-13 / 2026-04-19 121 0 0 .asc
2026-04-13 W16-2026 2026-04-06 / 2026-04-12 182 0 0 尚未
2026-04-06 W15-2026 2026-03-30 / 2026-04-05 114 1 0 尚未
2026-03-30 W14-2026 2026-03-23 / 2026-03-29 153 0 0 尚未
2026-03-23 W13-2026 2026-03-16 / 2026-03-22 124 1 0 尚未
2026-03-16 W12-2026 2026-03-09 / 2026-03-15 136 1 0 尚未
2026-03-09 W11-2026 2026-03-02 / 2026-03-08 140 0 0 尚未

标注为「尚未」的行表示未来或尚未生效的周——每行将在对应周一后首次页面加载时生成可下载的 .asc 文件。

为何 我们公开这些

A warrant canary is not a cryptographic proof of anything positive — it is a ritual of negative disclosure. In jurisdictions where a legal order can compel a provider not to speak about the order itself, the order cannot compel the provider to continue to publish a signed statement that the order has not occurred. The absence of the expected signature therefore communicates information that the issuing authority cannot lawfully block.

Our canary is renewed every Monday. If the W22-2026 signing is not followed by a 2026-06-01 signing (or a same-week infrastructure-incident post-mortem on /status that explains the delay), the reasonable inference after 2026-06-08 is that BitVPS Ltd has received a category of order described above and has been compelled to remain silent about it. You should then migrate away, rotate credentials, and treat our infrastructure as hostile until the canary returns with a fresh post-mortem.

This document is governed by the Terms of Service and the operational policies at /privacy, /abuse, and /dmca. It is not legal advice; it is an operational signal.

透明金丝雀 常见问题

How the canary works, how to verify it, what a missing signature means and which jurisdictions it covers.

什么是透明金丝雀?
A warrant canary is a routinely published statement asserting that the publisher has not received certain classes of secret legal process — typically a National Security Letter, a gag-bound subpoena, or a bulk-surveillance order. If the statement disappears or fails to renew, the inference is that such an order has been received and the publisher has been compelled to remain silent about it.
What does a missing canary mean?
If the canary is more than seven days late and there is no infrastructure post-mortem on /status explaining the delay, treat BitVPS as compromised: migrate workloads, rotate credentials and assume any data on our infrastructure is at risk. Latency alone is not proof of compulsion, but it is the only signal we are legally able to give.
How do I verify the PGP signature?
Fetch our master public key from /pgp/, import it with gpg --import, confirm the fingerprint matches the one published on this page, then run gpg --verify canary.asc against the clearsigned text above. The output must contain “Good signature” and the matching fingerprint — anything else means the canary is invalid.
Why weekly and not daily?
Weekly cadence balances signal freshness against operational risk: signing requires a human operator to physically reach an offline keystore. Daily signing increases the chance of a benign miss (travel, illness, hardware failure) being misread as compulsion. Seven days gives readers a clear staleness threshold while keeping the signing ritual sustainable.
Has the canary ever been late?
No. Every weekly signing since the canary was established has been published on schedule with a valid PGP signature. The full archive is available below — each entry is independently verifiable against the public key, and historical signings remain on the site permanently so the chain cannot be silently rewritten.
What jurisdictions does this canary cover?
The canary covers BitVPS Ltd. and its operating subsidiaries in every jurisdiction where we hold infrastructure: Iceland, the Netherlands, Romania and Switzerland. It explicitly disclaims receipt of any National Security Letter, gag order, bulk-surveillance order or equivalent compelled-silence instrument from any government in those jurisdictions or their mutual legal assistance partners.